Financial

BusinessWeek Florida’s Big Insurance Problem

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November 13  |  Financial, Florida, News  |   admin

Thursday November 13, 8:08 am ET

By Nanette Byrnes

When Hurricane Ike took a left on Sept. 8, heading away from Florida, locals breathed a sigh of relief. Not only are their homes on the line with each burst of violent weather but their pocketbooks are increasingly at risk, too. Over the past four years, Florida taxpayers’ vulnerability to a major weather catastrophe has grown.

The quasi-governmental company that was conceived as an insurer of last resort, Citizens Property Insurance, has become Florida’s top underwriter of homeowners’ insurance. Citizens now has more than $433 billion of property exposure on its books, and Florida has exacerbated that risk by getting into the reinsurance business as well. “It’s a disaster,” says Brian P. Sullivan, editor of Property Insurance Report. “This is not something the public should be dabbling with.”

Florida’s concentration of risk in the hands of taxpayers is an example of the potential risks of having states supplement private-sector insurance. While Florida is particularly exposed to hurricanes, states including Texas and Louisiana also have increasingly popular state-sponsored insurance funds. And there’s talk in Washington of adding wind coverage to the federal flood insurance program. The appeal for homeowners: reasonably priced policies that offer relief from rising rates. But critics say that, in Florida at least, the state-sponsored player has inadequate reserves to cover future losses if a big storm hits, and that private companies find it tough to compete. “If the market behaved more rationally, prices would likely go up,” says Ross Buchmueller, chief executive of PURE Risk Management, which writes only high-end homeowners’ insurance in Florida.

On the surface, Citizens looks like an attractive option. The insurer is projecting a $4 billion surplus at the end of this year, says spokesman John Kuczwanski. But risk modelers project a rise in hurricanes, which could lead to heavy losses. According to the pro-industry Florida Insurance Council, if a category 4 or 5 storm hit Miami, it could cost $50 billion in repairs. Hurricane Katrina cost insurers $44.9 billion nationwide, according to insurance credit-rating agency A.M. Best.

Insurers typically try to spread the risk of such major calamities by buying reinsurance. Florida has instead taken on $28 billion worth of reinsurance risk itself, and its reinsurance pool would have to issue bonds for anything over $7.8 billion in losses. (The state’s entire 2007-08 budget is $70 billion.) Given the credit market’s volatility, taxpayers could face a huge bill. In July the state agreed to pay $224 million to Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK-A – News) just for the right to borrow $4 billion if insurance fund losses exceed $16 billion before May 15, 2009.

Citizens was never meant to grow to this size. It now has 1 million policies in force and accounts for 28% of all written premiums for homeowners’ insurance — more than double its nearest rival, State Farm Insurance. Formed as a backstop in 2002, the company took off after three major hurricanes in 2004 and 2005.

Faced with state-imposed limits on raising rates to cover their risks, insurers began to pull out of Florida. Allstate Insurance (NYSE:ALL – News) has reduced its presence by two thirds since 2004, writing 500,000 fewer homeowners’ policies. State Farm, meanwhile, is appealing for a 47% rate increase and stopped writing new policies in Florida in February. Earlier this year it also canceled coverage on all homes within a mile of the coastline. “We are very concerned about the financial condition of State Farm Florida,” says spokesman Chris Neal. “Even in nonhurricane years, we have continued to lose money.”

As Citizens grows, how much liability could taxpayers face? With foreclosures rising and reconstruction costs high, it seems that Florida’s next big hurricane could leave a wake of financial destruction.

What Has Been the Industry Trend Regarding Insurer Ratings

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January 16  |  Financial, News  |   admin

There is no doubt the propensity over the last five to six for the dominant rating agency of the U.S. insurance industry, A.M. Best, is to downgrade property-liability insurers.

This could reflect a general deteriorating credit worthiness of the industry in general or an overall increase in the performance threshold’s Best’s has deemed necessary to achieve a given rating classification. Consistent with a recent study of corporate bond ratings, there is evidence of an increase in rating stringency. There appears to be pressure for insurers to maintain their existing ratings which provides a plausible explanation of the dramatic buildup of capital in the industry during the 1990’s. In addition, trends suggest Best’s raised the bar in terms of capital required to maintain the highest ratings differential relative to the increase in standards they required for lower rated categories. The actual pattern of capital buildup across firms in different rating categories is consistent with an attempt by the high quality firms to defend these ratings.

What Do Consumers Value?

Consumers, overwhelmingly, value insurers with strong financial ratings. The size of companies and scope of their activities was less important than their consistently strong balance sheet and income statement. Having their performance validated by independent third-party rating organization provided additional peace of mind.

Insurance Company Financial Stability Ratings – Important?

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January 16  |  Financial, News  |   admin

The financial strength of an insurer is often the most critical component of your financial future.

To operate effectively in today’s insurance marketplace, strong and stable financial strength ratings are widely regarded as a necessity. There are many recognized rating agencies, such as A.M. Best and Standard & Poors, just to name a few.

Over 100 Years Experience and Expertise Rating Insurance Companies:

For many years, A.M. Best was the sole source of this type of analysis. Since the early 1980’s, a handful of additional firms have joined the property-casualty insurer rating and financial analysis industry. Risk Managers and insurance professionals view these agencies as complementary; banks view them as necessary and usually require a certain letter rating to satisfy loan requirements.

2004 / 2005 Hurricane Seasons

Following the most active hurricane seasons in Florida’s history there has been a lot of attention devoted to the issue of insurer insolvency. Insurer evaluation organizations have become a hot commodity. New rating organizations have appeared on the market, and well established rating companies have modified their methodology to reflect differences in financial conditions. New products have been developed providing access to specific insurer information.

Suffice it to say, analyzing insurers’ overall performance and financial strength is a task that requires specialized skills.

Do You Understand Financial Ratings?

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January 16  |  Financial, News  |   admin

Understanding insurer financial ratings and the actual methodology used in arriving at ratings is very involved and complex. Various companies have different philosophies and approaches to arriving at their specific ratings, however, some commonalties do exist.

There are general quantitative and qualitative factors that are considered in assigning insurer ratings.

Some of the quantitative factors are:

Profitability

  • Combined Ratio
  • Return on Assets
  • Loss Ratio

Investments

  • Quality
  • Diversification

Leverage
Liquidity
Risk-based Capitalization

Some of the qualitative factors are:

  • Parent Affiliation
  • Competitive Position
  • Product
  • Geographical Diversification
  • Adequacy of Reserves
  • Management Philosophy
  • Stability of Performance
  • Market Conditions

Recognized rating organizations include A.M. Best, Weiss, Demotech, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.

It is difficult to evaluate the information provided by these organizations and if you do not understand it, you should consult with your insurance agent or the applicable rating organization, regarding their specific rating methodology.

Demotech CEO Meeting with Florida Policymakers on Cat Fund Dilemma

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January 15  |  Financial, Florida, News  |   admin

01/15/2009

Demotech CEO Joe Petrelli is in Tallahassee today and Friday for meetings with state policymakers and staff, including Florida Insurance Council representatives, on the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund shortfall.

Many FIC members received a letter from Demotech in November warning that absent a Cat Fund financing solution, they will be required to demonstrate adequate alternative financing to maintain their Demotech Financial Stability Rating after May 15.

“CEO Joe Petrelli will be visiting many key policymakers to discuss the letter and to bring some ideas to assist the state with the Cat Fund shortfall,” Lisa Miller, consultant for Demotech, said this morning. “Demotech is doing everything it can to work with regulators and state policymakers toward solutions in the marketplace. The purpose of the visits the next two days to start a dialog on ways to work together so that the Legislature will have as much information as possible when it deliberates the Cat Fund.”

Jack Nicholson, Cat Fund CEO, told the Senate Banking & Insurance Committee Wednesday the program “is way short” of financing even the mandatory layer, which would be about $17 billion for the 2009 hurricane season. There seems to be agreement among most following this issue that it is impossible, for all practical purposes, to finance TICL, which would be another $13 billion for 2009, unless Congress quickly establishes a National Catastrophe Fund.

“Since the fall of 1996, Demotech, Inc., has reviewed and assigned Financial Stability Ratings to virtually all of the start-up Property and Casualty insurance companies writing property insurance in the State of Florida,” Demotech wrote in the letter to insurers.

“…The potential inability of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund to honor meritorious claims related to a significant event adversely influences the Financial Stability Rating of each of the carriers that are heavily dependent on the reinsurance provided by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe fund. Under current circumstances and conditions, we will provide, monitor and support Financial Stability Ratings through the period ending May 15, 2009. An extension of financial Stability Ratings beyond May 15, 2009, will require definitive financial information regarding participation in the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, documentation of bridge loans or alternative financing mechanisms that provide liquidity during a period in which the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund would be raising capital and other precaution or protection regarding reinsurance collectability or catastrophe reinsurance.”

Demotech Recent Events Affecting Financial Stability Ratings®

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November 15  |  Demotech, Financial, Florida, News  |   admin

2715 Tuller Parkway Dublin, Ohio 43017-2310

Tel: 614 761-8602 800 354-7207 Fax: 614 761-0906

www.demotech.com

November 2008

Recent Events Affecting Financial Stability Ratings® for Florida Property and Casualty Insurance Companies Require Supplemental Information Since the fall of 1996, Demotech, Inc. has reviewed and assigned Financial Stability Ratings® to virtually all of the start-up Property and Casualty insurance companies writing property insurance in the State of Florida. This effort facilitated the depopulation of the Florida Residential Property Casualty Joint Underwriting Association and, more recently, its successor, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.

From 1996 until the passage of House Bill 1A, two of the implicit and critical assumptions underlying our willingness to review and rate these relatively small and heavily reinsured carriers were the commitment of the State of Florida’s Office of Insurance Regulation to require actuarially sound base rates and the breadth and scope of the private sector’s response to the reinsurance needs of the carriers. Since the passage of HB 1A in January 2007, discussion related to rate adequacy has arisen. Similarly, the financial capability of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund to honor meritorious requests for reinsurance recoverables has been called into question.

In Demotech’s view of the current situation, a decline in the base rates applicable to homeowners insurance has resulted from the implementation of HB 1A. Further, the published financial statements of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund indicate that a significant event would not be fully funded. Accordingly, even though Demotech understands that the State of Florida, or if necessary, the federal government, would likely step in to provide the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund with a bridge loan or other support, Demotech does not have definitive financial information or confirmation of that critical assumption.

The potential inability of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund to honor meritorious claims related to a significant event adversely influences the Financial Stability Rating® of each of the carriers that are heavily dependent on the reinsurance provided by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.

Under current circumstances and conditions, we will provide, monitor and support Financial Stability Ratings® through the period ending May 15, 2009. An extension of Financial Stability Ratings® beyond May 15, 2009 will require definitive financial information regarding participation in the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, documentation of bridge loans or alternative financing mechanisms that provide liquidity during a period in which the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund would be raising capital, and any other precaution or protection regarding reinsurance collectability or catastrophe reinsurance.

Please provide the requested information regarding specific plans for ensuring adequate funding relating to future reinsurance recoverables as it is finalized or updated. If you have any questions or comments, please contact me at 614-761-8602.

Very truly yours,

Joseph L. Petrelli

President

Miami Herald How secure is Citizens Property Insurance?

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July 14  |  Financial, Florida, News  |   admin

Posted on Mon, Jul. 14, 2008

In less than four years, Citizens Property Insurance went from being a temporary fix for Florida’s troubled insurance market to the state’s largest insurer of homes, condos and apartments.

Along the way, it has paid out nearly $5.9 billion in 313,237 claims from eight hurricanes. It ramped up operations to handle catastrophes practically as the storms raged. Its staff has gone from fewer than 100 to more than 1,000. And it took on some 300,000 policies practically overnight when three insurers failed two years ago.

BIG BREAK

Citizens — and all insurers working in Florida — got a big break in the past two years because no hurricane made a direct hit on the state.

The question now: Is Citizens, with nearly 1.3 million policyholders, prepared to handle what 2008 may bring?

Bruce Douglas, Citizens’ outgoing chairman of its board of governors, and Scott Wallace, its president, say the company is ready to deal with a major storm.

”We’re expecting the worst, but we’re hoping for the best,” says Douglas.

Citizens has established an operations center in Jacksonville to handle storm claims, it has nearly 5,000 adjusters under contract and it has money in the bank — that’s cash and borrowed funds. It has bought private backup insurance to reduce some of its windstorm losses.

Still, some policyholders are wary.

After being dropped by USAA, Richard Francis ended up with Citizens for his home in Anna Maria, near Bradenton. Citizens’ rate was lower than what he was offered by the sole private carrier willing to write him a windstorm policy.

”I am presently insured by Citizens, but envision a nightmare in trying to — God forbid — ever submit a claim” to the company, Francis says.

No doubt, Citizens has learned from its mistakes. In late 2004 and early 2005, it was bogged down by mismanagement, especially of its claims operations. Allegations of self-dealing and conflicts of interest plagued the actions of former top officials.

Since then, various task forces and oversight committees have dissected the company’s operations. It now has a conflict-of-interest policy in place, and executives and new hires are better screened.

A big factor in handling claims for any insurer is having the cash on hand to cut self-dealing and conflicts of interest plagued the actions of former top officials.

Since then, various task forces and oversight committees have dissected the company’s operations. It now has a conflict-of-interest policy in place, and executives and new hires are better screened.

A big factor in handling claims for any insurer is having the cash on hand to cut checks right after a big storm so its policyholders can begin repairs. Citizens is counting on having at least $4.1 billion in surplus by year-end to pay claims. That’s hard cash.

It also has arranged lines of credit, sold notes and set up agreements with investors to buy bonds totalling another $4.2 billion that the insurer could tap. Of the total, $2.5 billion would cover Citizen’s riskiest policies — those in the wind pool area, generally east of Interstate 95 in South Florida.

Citizens also has back-up insurance from the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. It has $7.4 billion in reinsurance for its windstorm policies and another $4.3 billion for its multiperil and commercial policies, which include condo and homeowners associations.

The Florida CAT fund provides 96 percent of Citizens’ reinsurance.

SUBPRIME CONNECTION

Citizens itself is managing its borrowed money for now, rather than giving it to Wall Street money managers to invest. The return on these invested funds is greater than the interest Citizens must pay on the debt, so the insurer is in a good position.

However, the meltdown of the sub-prime mortgage market caught the insurer flatfooted last summer and threw off its usual financing and investment strategy.

The State Board of Administration, which had been managing Citizens’ money, bought some securities tied to the subprime mortgages that were downgraded shortly after the underlying loans defaulted. Citizens has written down $88.5 million because of losses on some of these investments. As of early July, it still has $96.5 million frozen in a fund managed by the SBA.

FIRST IN LINE

The new 2008 insurance bill simplified how Citizens assesses its own policyholders to make up a shortfall, but they’re still the first in line to be hit with extra charges. They could see charges of up to 45 percent of their annual premium in one year if there is a shortfall.

If the assessments to its own policyholders don’t cover the deficit, Citizens can impose a surcharge of up to 6 percent a year on all the insurance policies in the state.

Although Citizens’ has planned carefully and is watching its pennies closely, policyholders might not be able to avoid more surcharges if the insurer faces another shortfall.

”We’re talking about being able to handle a very big storm with a small Citizens policyholder assessment,” says Sharon Binnun, Citizens’ senior vice president for accounting and chief financial officer. She estimates Citizens could weather a hurricane that produced windstorm losses of about $6.4 billion with only a small assessment.

It’s Citizens’ reliance on the state CAT fund and its huge exposure — nearly $475 billion — that has many people worried. If the CAT fund can’t tap the credit markets for the cash it would need to back up Citizens and all the private insurers working Florida, the state’s entire insurance market could collapse.

”Citizens is a disaster waiting to happen,” says Barney Bishop, president of Associated Industries of Florida, a lobbying group that represents small and medium-sized businesses around the state. He worries a big storm will wipe out Citizens and the CAT Fund and impose huge assessments on consumers.

LAST RESORT

Bishop would prefer to see Citizens return to being just the insurer of last resort and not be allowed to compete with the private carriers.

Citizens’ policy count hasn’t grown as quickly as expected in the past two years. The insurer was required to take on more than 300,000 policies when the three Poe Financial Group companies — Atlantic Preferred, Florida Preferred and Southern Family — collapsed in 2006. The additional load required more staff and a processing center in Tampa.

But 12 Florida-based insurers have taken more than 432,000 policies from Citizens in the past 18 months. All of these policies have come from Citizens’ personal lines account, where the policies cover properties outside the state’s wind-pool region.

Though the number of overall policies is lower, the company’s total exposure has continued to climb.

William Murray, president of Nausch, Hogan and Murray, a Miami-based insurance brokerage, says Citizens has become more responsive to agents’ needs and the company “is accessible when you need it.”

However, Murray worries that Citizens’ rates, especially for condo buildings and associations, aren’t sufficient given the exposure the insurer has taken on.

Binnun attributes that to rising insured values. Also, the takeouts didn’t affect the number of windstorm policies Citizens is carrying.

Several regulatory changes in early 2007 have allowed homeowners to stay with Citizens even if they get a takeout offer from a private carrier. Now, takeout firms must set their rates below Citizens. Also, Citizens can now sell a multiperil policy – one that includes windstorm as well as fire, theft and liability in the windstorm area – to bring in extra premiums and help diversify its risk.

Yet, some agents, such as Robert Reynolds with Miami agency Morris & Reynolds, believes the total cost is lower for consumers with a wind-only policy from Citizens.

BLACK EYE IN ’04

Undoubtably, what has given Citizens its biggest black eye is how poorly it handled claims after the 2004 storms and initially after Hurricane Wilma hit South Florida the following year. So, the company has spent a lot of time and money in the past two years revamping its claims and catastrophe operations.

To be sure, Citizens was barely a company in the summer of 2004. It had opened its doors in 2002, created by combining the old windstorm pool that had been around for more than 30 years and the Joint Underwriting Association formed after Hurricane Andrew devastated South Florida in 1992. After that storm, many private carriers that had never contended with a hurricane’s damage fled the state. To complicate the situation, 11 poorly capitalized companies failed.

Citizens was ill-prepared to deal with the four 2004 hurricanes that hit the state. It had five staffers assigned to its claims operations, working out of a small office suite near the state capitol in Tallahassee. It had planned on having about 500 adjusters at its disposal if needed, but none were on staff. All worked for independent firms hired by the insurer.

By the fall, the insurer was already facing more than $1.1 billion in insured losses from the storms.

Citizens quickly found out that many of the adjusters it expected to work for the insurer were missing in action, often working for another insurance company that paid more. Worse yet, many adjusters who showed up to work weren’t trained or supervised by Citizens. Many claims were delayed, mismanaged and improperly adjusted and gave rise to many claims disputes.

An audit released in early 2006 found claims after the 2005 storms were handled more efficiently than after the 2004 cycle. But problems stemming from inexperienced and poorly trained adjusters continued to plague the company and its policyholders. A task force set up by the Legislature in 2006 heard from hundreds of consumers. Their No. 1 complaint: Poorly trained adjusters.

Getting a handle on its claims operators and providing adjuster education were key recommendations from this task force, which presented its final report last month.

Citizens’ management already had taken some of those recommendations to heart.

ARMY OF ADJUSTERS

It now has about 5,000 independent adjusters under contract via 44 adjusting firms. These adjusters are required to make Citizens’ work their first priority, and their work will be closely monitored by 68 supervisors inside Citizens. All the adjusters have to go through a training session covering the company’s adjusting practices and Florida’s building codes.

Last month, the company ran a hurricane drill, mobilizing adjusters and staffers to see how its procedures would work.

Wallace says the company’s claims staff has nearly doubled in the past year. David Emery, Citizens’ vice president for operations, contends Citizens is now set up to do what the large, long-established insurers can do: Quickly deploy large teams of adjusters to do early damage assessments and begin the claims-paying process. The insurance bill passed this year requires that Citizens, and all insurers in Florida, pay claims quickly. The undisputed portion of a claim must be paid within 90 days, or the firms can be sued under the state’s bad-faith trade laws.

Still, says Paul Brawner, director of professional development for Florida Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors and a former independent agent, “the sheer volume of policies it has to handle overloads the staff and you run into delays servicing policies and processing claims.”

© 2008 Miami Herald Media Company. All Rights Reserved.

http://www.miamiherald.com

The Times-Picayune New insurers seize opening in La. market

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May 31  |  Financial, Louisiana, News  |   admin

Posted by Rebecca Mowbray, The Times-Picayune May 31, 2008 8:11PM

While big insurance companies have mostly stopped writing new homeowners policies in south Louisiana, a renegade group of mostly start-up insurance companies is marching into the disaster zone to fill the void.

Most of them hail from Florida, where about 25 new property insurance companies were formed in the last two years as big players exited the market. As those companies gain traction, many are seeking to expand to other insurance-starved coastal states such as Louisiana on the theory that they can collect high premiums and dilute their risk by writing policies in a larger geographic area.

“Our business is to focus on catastrophe-prone areas,” said Dale Hammond, president and chief executive of HomeWise Insurance Group, a company that spread from Florida to Texas and this year to Louisiana and South Carolina. “There’s a lot of new money coming in to support companies like HomeWise.”

Armed with detailed business plans, sophisticated computer models and confidence in modern building codes, these entrepreneurs say they are starting companies that might not have been possible even a decade ago. They believe they can function better in risky coastal zones than their well-established brethren because they’re not distracted by auto and life insurance sales or stuck with heaps of unwanted policies in their portfolios from times of calmer weather.

While the formation of these niche companies since the legendary 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons could be a peek into the future of coastal insurance markets, it also amounts to a grand experiment being conducted on homeowners in coastal areas across the South.

“If they do it right, and manage everything right, it could work out fairly well for them and the people they write,” said Robert Klein, director of the Center for Risk Management and Insurance Research at Georgia State University. “What doesn’t work is if a company writes too many high-risk exposures and it doesn’t have sufficient capital and reinsurance to withstand a reasonable hurricane scenario.”

Critics note that many of these companies have little operational experience and have managed to grow quickly with the help of easy capital from state incentive programs.

Homeowners who take out a policy with a company that has never been tested by a major storm could face a considerable amount of risk.

“I always worry about start-ups, especially if start-ups are heading into risky ventures like hurricane areas,” said Bob Hunter, director of insurance at the Consumer Federation of America. “I don’t think there’s any doubt that a small company can be excellent. But the problem is that for every 10 start-ups, probably five go under. Which are the good ones?

That’s hard for consumers to figure out.”

Since January of last year, 12 insurance companies have applied do business in Louisiana or add homeowners insurance to their licenses, according to records at the Louisiana Department of Insurance. Not as much activity is taking place as it appears from the statistics, however. Only five of the 12 companies that applied to do business here have Louisiana homeowners plans at this time.

Another 12 companies have applied to write commercial or homeowners insurance policies as surplus lines carriers, which means that they must meet more stringent capital requirements than regular admitted insurance carriers, but they are not backed by the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association.

“I think this is a really, really positive sign for the future of our market,” Insurance Commissioner Jim Donelon said.

The overwhelming feature of the companies that are actively trying to get started in Louisiana is their newness.

Joe Potrelli, president of the Ohio company Demotech Inc., which provides financial ratings for young insurance companies, said that these start-ups have a different approach to insuring coastal property.

He noted that many big, established companies don’t want to work in catastrophe-prone areas because they don’t want their quarterly earnings torpedoed by a storm or wildfire.

“The Wall Street analysts got involved a number of years ago and said, ‘What the heck are you doing insuring coastal property? We like stable earnings,’¤” Potrelli said.

By contrast, investors who launch start-ups in catastrophe-prone areas know that they’re in a high-risk venture, and they’re highly motivated to stick to their plans. Many of these small companies are being started by people with years of management experience who understand challenging coastal markets, such as HomeWise’s Hammond, who has 38 years of executive experience with big-name insurers such as Travelers.

The key consideration with start-up companies, Potrelli said, is reinsurance. Most spend about 70 percent of the premiums they collect on buying insurance to cover their claims in the event of a catastrophe. Because reinsurers are so heavily invested in the companies, the relationship is more of a partnership than a product sale, because the reinsurer has a big stake in making sure the start-up insurer can survive.

For anyone in Louisiana who may be worried about how this strategy works, Potrelli said that of the 70 companies that Demotech rated at the time of the record 2004 and 2005 storm seasons, only one failed. “I think the system was severely tested,” Potrelli said.

But Hunter, the consumer advocate, said he’s not sure how much stock to place in a Demotech rating. Although the state accepts Demotech ratings before it issues an insurance license, Hunter said he does not know how rigorous its process is compared with that of the ratings standard-bearer, A.M. Best Co. He’s also troubled that Demotech describes itself as a consulting firm that offers ratings services to its clients.

“That raises questions of conflict. If you’re a ratings agency, you have to have arms length,” he said.

Hunter is also concerned about how well-capitalized these fast-growing companies are, and whether they’ll be able to manage their operations and get adjusters in the field if a storm strikes. Moreover, he’s concerned that Florida’s $250 million Capital Build-Up Incentive Program for matching loans and Louisiana’s $100 million Insure Louisiana could attract people seeking easy money.

Whether these state investments pay off in the form of a stronger property insurance market remains to be seen. The Florida Legislature recently passed a bill that would renew the loan program, but that also relaxes the requirements for the number of policies the companies have to write, because companies were having trouble fulfilling them.

Florida Gov. Charlie Crist vetoed that bill last week because the money to finance continuation of the program would have depleted resources from Florida Citizens.

Donelon says he’s not worried at this point about grant recipients meeting the requirements for taking policies out of Citizens and writing new policies in hurricane stricken parishes.

Klein, the Georgia State professor, said that some niche insurance players, such as auto insurer Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., which started off insuring the drivers that no one else wanted, became so successful in the high-risk market that it became a major player for standard car insurance.

But coastal homeowners insurance, which risks massive losses at one time, is different. ”Niche playing hasn’t been as prominent in the homeowners business in the past, but with this catastrophic risk problem being what it is, it seems that this is a phenomenon that we’re going to see more of,” Klein said. “How far it will go, and how many of these existing properties they are able to absorb, that remains to be seen.”

Donelon said he believes the greatest potential to lessen the property insurance crunch in Louisiana comes from small and regional insurance companies. He said Louisiana has been very careful to make sure that these companies are financially strong, but that consumers should turn to insurance agents for help in evaluating companies. He also noted that Louisiana has a track record of ensuring solvency, because no companies failed in the state after the 2005 storms.

But to give consumers extra assurance, the insurance department is pushing Senate Bill 240 to increase the capacity of the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association. “Folks who buy coverage from companies that they’re not familiar with can rest assured that their coverage is there even if that company were to go under,” Donelon said.

But the real test may be whether these start-up companies are palatable to insurance agents, whose reputations are at stake in the communities where they work.

Marc Eagan, president of the Eagan Insurance Agency in Metairie, said his firm won’t represent companies that don’t have at least an A-minus rating from A.M. Best, and that he would go for highly rated surplus lines insurers with an A.M. Best rating before he’d consider start-up regular insurance companies with the Demotech rating.

“We are concerned about companies coming in and trying to position themselves because of the condition of the marketplace. Are their claims-paying abilities going to be there?”

Eagan said. “Our firm is bigger than most of these companies. That’s scary.”

South Florida Sun-Sentinel Florida’s CFO Opposes Extending Rate Freeze On Citizens Insurance

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April 8  |  Financial, Florida, News  |   admin

Florida’s CFO Opposes Extending Rate Freeze On Citizens

Insurance

Copyright: South Florida Sun-Sentinel

Source: South Florida Sun-Sentinel (KRT)

Apr. 8–Florida Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink said Tuesday she opposes extending a freeze on Citizens Property Insurance Corp.’s rates another year.

“To extend that freeze means we’re going to be more and more under water,” Sink said at a meeting with the South Florida Sun-Sentinel editorial board.

The rate freeze, enacted by the Legislature last year, has resulted in some Citizens policy holders paying up to 50 percent less than they should, she said. And that could mean trouble for most Floridians, who pay fees on their homeowners policies when major hurricanes strike and Citizens goes in the red, she added.

Extending the freeze through 2009 is one of many controversial parts of a sweeping property insurance bill aimed at holding insurers accountable for pricing strategies and unfair trade practices.

The bill, SB2860, passed its first key test Tuesday, with a green light from the Senate General Government Appropriations committee, led by several senators who have opposed parts of the bill.

Sen. Jeff Atwater, R- North Palm Beach, the bill’s co-sponsor, has called the legislation a consumers’ ”bill of rights” for property insurance. The bill would beef up penalties for insurers who violate state laws, broaden the state’s power in blocking rate hikes and hold the industry accountable to state antitrust and unfair trade practices laws.

The bill is based on findings from a Senate panel that grilled insurance company executives in February. There’s less support for the proposals in the House of Representatives.

Industry representatives said the bill’s antitrust provision would trigger more lawsuits and, in turn, rate hikes.

“We’re about to kill the golden goose,” said Mark Delegal, a lobbyist for State Farm, the largest private company insuring Florida properties. Regulators said State Farm recently informed them of plans to close the door on most new policies in the state.

Insurance industry representatives said another provision — forbidding Citizens from selling any new policies that only provide windstorm coverage — could also spark rate hikes, as consumers who want Citizens are forced to buy all their coverage from the public insurer.

But Atwater said the idea of the bill is to prevent companies from cherry-picking the most profitable types of coverage and “dumping” the state with the riskiest part. Beefing up Citizens’ bottom line reduces the risk of deficits, he said.

In a related matter, the Senate committee approved a separate bill, SB2156, Tuesday that would shrink by $3 billion the $28 billion Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, which provides insurers with cheaper backup coverage.Sink pitched the idea of shrinking the fund this year because she’s concerned about the risk it poses to Florida policy holders, who help pay its deficits.

Sink has been less vocal about her concerns with Citizens. She said Citizens should increase its rates slowly over several years to minimize the impact on policy holders.

South Florida residents hold about half of Citizens’ 1.3 million policies.

“Citizens writes 30 percent of the policies in this state. The other 70 percent of the people are in effect subsidizing Citizens policy holders,” said Sink, adding that she supports the Atwater bill’s ”consumer-friendly” spirit overall.”From a policy standpoint, I think that’s OK because we know these are homeowners, some of them are coastal, and they have no other choice. But how much is too much of a subsidy? That’s the policy question we need to be asking ourselves as Floridians.”

Small cap insurer Universal Insurance (UVE) plays a high stakes game in Florida

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January 15  |  Financial, Florida, News  |   admin

January-15-2008

by Tarn P Crowe

Universal Insurance’s website (at universalproperty.com) gives the appearance that this Florida insurer possesses sound financial strength. A red elephant stands proudly next to the company’s logo and the financial stability rating of “A Exceptional” appears further down the home page.

However, dig a little deeper and you may conclude that Universal’s financial condition is not as rosy as it appears.

Universal’s questionable rating Firstly, the “A” rating does not come from a nationally recognized rating service such as S& P or Moodys but from a lesser known rating service used by smaller insurers known as Demotech.

Demotech’s definition of this rating follows:-

A – Exceptional financial stability

Regardless of the severity of a general economic downturn or a deterioration in the insurance cycle, insurers earning a Financial Stability Rating® of “A” possess exceptional financial stability related to withstanding a general economic downturn or deterioration of an underwriting cycle.

I believe this rating is misleading and in this article I will detail my reasons for this. Insurers can minimize their underwriting risk by writing policies in different States, giving them geographic diversity, and by writing multiple product lines they lower their product risk exposure.

Universal Insurance carries greater risk because it is a one state and one product company. Operating in Florida through its subsidiary Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Company(UPCIC) it principally writes homeowners insurance which represents 85% of its premiums and a further 15% of premiums come from dwelling insurance.

Being based in Florida means UPCIC is exposed to substantial catastrophe risk from hurricanes. Further, because it is 100% exposed to property, its losses from hurricane damage will have a greater affect on its financial position than on other more diversified insurers operating in Florida.

Universal expands business rapidly by taking big risks In the wake of the dislocation in the Florida insurance market after the strong hurricane season in 2005 that resulted in larger insurers reducing their policy coverage in Florida, UPCIC took the opportunity to grow its policy count and expand its premiums rapidly and as of June 2007 had captured a 3% share of the homeowners insurance market in Florida , with around 341,000 policies.

This rapid business growth is reflected in Universal’s financial results. Based on the September 2007 quarter, year over year comparison, Universal’s earnings growth is 237% and revenue growth 136%. Meanwhile it had an impressive return on equity of 131% and combined ratio in the 70s. Universal’s premiums written have grown from $41 mil in 2004 to $371 mil in 2006 and are $263 mil for the first half of 2007.

Shareholders equity has expanded almost three-fold from $22 million at December 2006 to $63 million at September 2007.

Yet all this has been achieved by Universal taking on enormous risk, a strategy of win big or lose massively.

At the Small cap equity conference in August 2007, Bradley Meier ,CEO of Universal , detailed Universal’s exposure to a major hurricane or catastrophe. He said that based on their models, Universal would take a $45 million dollar hit on the first storm, $9 million on the second event and $9 million on a third event. Translated, if the hurricane events of 2004 or 2005 repeated themselves in 2007, Universal would have been exposed to $63 million in losses before tax, over $40 million after tax. That would have taken a 67% chunk out of shareholders equity of just $63 million.

Universal relies on models due to its short operating history Furthermore, these forecasts given by Meier are based on models and assume reinsurance coverage. Universal’s models are based on industry data rather than individual data, because Universal is a relatively new insurer. If problems emerge that Universal’s models are not correct or a reinsurer is not prepared to foot the bill, Universal would have very little shareholder’s equity to play with. There is simply little or no margin of error.

A substantial hit to shareholders equity would threaten Universal’s risk based capital position under the Florida insurance Code and could force Universal into a substantial dilutive share offering to protect its capital position. It may in turn be required to reduce its premium levels to reflect its revised capital position.

Fortunately for Universal insurance , both 2006 and 2007 were benign years for hurricanes. However, there are no guarantees for 2008. Universal has indicated it is preparing to apply to other States to expand its geographic reach, one would suggest this should be a priority.

A further look at Universal’s reserve for unpaid losses and LAE estimates may give investors some more cause for concern. As at 31st December 2006, LAE estimates given by Universal’s actuaries were between $37 million to $60 million. Universal booked its actual reserves at $49 million. As well as the fact it is relying on industry data (due to its short claims history) , Universal’s reserves don’t provide much scope for error. If Universal had used the higher actuarial estimate of $60 million, this would have reduced its shareholder equity by 50% from $22 million to $11 million as at December 30, 2006.

Universal’s share price doesn’t account for risks Universal’s share price takes no account of the high levels of catastrophe risk faced by its operations. It sports a market cap of around $280 million or 4.4x its book value of $63 million. This is well above its peer average of 1.7x. Insiders have cashed in on the high share price selling 3.1 million shares over the last 6 months according to yahoo finance. There have been no insider buys during this time.

Concluding remarks

Universal has succeeded in growing rapidly in Florida however it has only achieved this by effectively “betting the house”. This Company does not deserve an A rating and its high share price masks the high level of catastrophe exposure its business faces.

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